A surprising connection on LinkedIn. An offer of employment from a recruiter, most likely a female agent, based in China. The opportunity to make perhaps £20,000 on the side writing a small number of geopolitical analyses for a firm from China peppered with “non-public” or “insider” insights. Payment in digital currency or physical money preferred.
It may seem obvious, in this scenario, that an element about this approach would be amiss. However, Beijing's powerful Ministry of State Security continues to view it valuable to deploy headhunters to try it – prompting MI5 to issue multiple warnings about their operations online.
Massive Contact Attempts on Social Media
Last year, MI5 chief Ken McCallum said operatives from China were contacting Britons on LinkedIn on an unprecedented level, at a frequency of 10,000 over the previous two and a half years, attempting to obtain governmental, commercial, defense and scientific classified information. However a fresh initiative aimed at politicians and parliament has prompted the spy agency to act again.
An espionage warning was issued on this week via the administrative teams of Lindsay Hoyle and his Lords counterpart: a single slide after the persistent attempts of Shirly Shen and other operatives to contact Members of Parliament, lords, their assistants, economic experts, thinktanks – anybody who might become a source.
Security Strategy and Legislative Changes
In the curious style of UK security services, there was no publication of the protective guidance from the agency or the interior ministry. Yet the agency was aware its advisory document would leak once it was sent electronically out to parliament. Sharing it in the media helps the wider public better identify communications with a fraudulent purpose.
This warning has the impact of uncovering more information from in and around Westminster, though that is not MI5’s primary purpose. The service aims for public figures to recognize that simply because exchanges on LinkedIn are less overtly risky as on other social platforms, it does not mean they are without risk.
Nor is domestic spy agency understood to have been reacting to any specific incident in parliament, though the burst of activity occur after the embarrassing failure of the legal case of a former parliamentary aide Christopher Cash and his associate another person on a technicality earlier in the autumn.
The two had been accused of spying for China – a allegation they rejected – but failure to successfully conclude a trial under the now repealed Official Secrets Act led to concerns that British democracy had been left unprotected.
Revised Legislation and Beijing's Strategic Goals
Legislation has now been changed, and the security briefing contains a note of its replacement: “Those engaging in spying operations face significant legal consequences under the National Security Act.” This constitutes a crime if somebody participates in behavior that is or is likely to “significantly help a foreign intelligence service”.
A natural question, however, is what China has to gain. An elected representative who is outside ministerial roles will have limited knowledge of classified material, and an contact of theirs even less. Yet Beijing is also interested in parliament: for a period, in recent years, the UK’s approach to China on issues such as the telecom firm or the Uyghur repression or alleged atrocities was being influenced by MPs.
Cultural Differences and Ongoing Cyber Threats
In part there are distinct approaches as well. Authoritarian governments like China’s utilize intelligence collection methods and the scale of its intelligence apparatus is vast, engaging three hundred thousand people. A former US official, a US national cyber director under president Joe Biden, commented it was occasionally assessed that “the Chinese have more English speakers engaged in this than Western agencies have personnel with language skills”.
The Chinese government is prepared to cultivate contacts over the long term and sometimes even the intelligence services have found it difficult to distinguish between legitimate relationships and spying. “China has a minimal requirement for which details is considered to be useful,” security minister Dan Jarvis told parliamentarians on this week, but a rapid shift in the political cycle may mean someone rapidly marginal turning important.
An alternative perspective to think about the relentless activities at secret intelligence collection is in the wider context of the geopolitical contest between China and the west at a level below the level of outright war. China has stepped up its hacking efforts, with the one campaign penetration of communications systems in numerous nations, and the Volt Typhoon compromise of countless internet devices.
Beijing is engaged in persistent efforts to find covert sources on UK politics online because it seeks to be challenging, to demonstrate influence and because it has the capability.